U.S. Imperialism and U.S. Capitalism

In the aftermath of the U.S. intervention in Venezuela and the threats that President Donald Trump is making about U.S. actions in other countries—including deploying the military “if necessary”—there is a great deal of speculation about the government’s motivation. 

Is it the money to be made from control of Venezuela’s oil, in spite of the fact that profits from this oil are unlikely because it is of a type that is extremely costly to extract and refine?

Is it Trump’s megalomania?

Or is it simply to draw attention away from domestic scandals, the Epstein affair in particular, or the growing popular disgust with Trump’s efforts to expel immigrants?

Or maybe these are actions inherent to all great powers, from long before the Roman Empire to what the United States is doing today?

Or maybe simply: All of the above!

Two Points

While I am tempted to simply accept “all of the above,” there are two particular points I want to make about U.S. imperialism.

First, U.S. interventions abroad are nothing new. As outrageous as Trump and his minions have been in the current wave of imperial actions, there is ample precedent for those actions. 

Second, fundamental needs of U.S. capitalism have played a major role in motivating the U.S. government’s imperial actions. Other forms of economic organization have driven the international actions of other countries at other times. Capitalism is not the only system that has led to the search for wealth. It is, however, what we have in the United States and what drives our economy, at home and in its international adventures.

This is not to say that the other possible causes listed above are irrelevant, but simply that to understand what is going on, these two points are of considerable importance.

The History and the Motives

It is hard to say just when U.S. imperial expansion began. One might say it began with the settlements of Europeans on the east coast of what was to become the United States, their subsequent movement westward, and their decimation (by disease as well as military conquest) of Native Americans. Or we might mark U.S. imperialism from the late 19^th century, with the Spanish-American War and the takeover from Spain of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and various other lands. (But see below regarding many earlier U.S. military interventions abroad.)

The imperial spirit of the years following the Spanish-American War is captured by the famous quote from Smedley Butler:

“I spent 33 years and four months in active military service and during that period I spent most of my time as a high class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism. I helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. I helped purify Nicaragua for the International Banking House of Brown Brothers in 1902-1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for the American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras right for the American fruit companies in 1903. In China in 1927 I helped see to it that Standard Oil went on its way unmolested. Looking back on it, I might have given Al Capone a few hints. The best he could do was to operate his racket in three districts. I operated on three continents.”

It's worth noting that Butler was a Major General in the U.S. Marine Corps. At the time of his death in 1940, Butler was the most decorated Marine in U.S. military history. While Butler’s statement sites the numerous incidents of U.S. interventions in other countries, it also highlights what at least he saw as the motivating factor in those interventions. 

Usefully, in 1969, in an effort to justify U.S. foreign military actions, the Republican leader in the U.S. Senate, Everett McKinley Dirksen, entered into the Congressional Record a list of military actions abroad from 1798 to the early 1940s (the great majority of which did not involve declarations of war or other formal Congressional approval—like the recent U.S. action in Venezuela). There were over 150.

After World War II, U.S. interventions abroad took place under the rationale of the anti-communism of the Cold War, and the rhetoric was adopted from President Woodrow Wilson’s World War I claim of “making the world safe for democracy.” This was a thin claim, particularly, for example, in light of the CIA’s active role in the 1953 overthrow of Iran’s elected government. Not only was it directly connected to the interests of the major oil companies, but it set a path that has led to the current hostilities between the United States and Iran. In 1954 the CIA was, as in Iran, the instrument by which the U.S. government played its role in overthrowing the elected government of Guatemala, where the interests of the United Fruit Company were threatened.

There were several other cases in which elected governments were overthrown through actions that, while not involving direct U.S. military engagement, clearly required U.S. government approval and support. Chile (1973), the Congo (1961), and Brazil (1964) provide examples. Also, of course, there was the U.S. support of the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba (1961). And then there were the wars in Korea and Vietnam, with the latter deserving special attention.

 Vietnam and the Principle of Intervention

 Nine months before the French were defeated by the Viet Minh at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu and lost control of Vietnam, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, speaking on August 4, 1953 to the U.S. Governors’ Conference in Seattle, Wash., stated:

“Now let us assume that we lose Indochina. If Indochina goes, several things happen right away. The Malay Peninsula, that last little bit of land hanging on down there, would be scarcely defensible—and tin and tungsten that we so greatly value from that area would cease coming… So, you see, somewhere along the line, this must be blocked. It must be blocked now.”

This was an implicit statement of the “domino theory:” that if Vietnam fell to the Communists, who were leading the Viet Minh, independent countries and colonial control in the rest of the region would soon also fall to the Communists. This theory, combined with the supposed loss of access to tin and tungsten, provided Eisenhower with the rationale for supplying France with $400 million (about $4.8 billion in today’s dollars) for its military campaign to maintain control of Vietnam. The U.S. support of the French was, of course, provided in vain. A few years later, U.S. intervention would replace the French, which, again, would prove to be a failure. 

Here, in Eisenhower’s speech, is a principle that covers many, if not all, U.S. interventions, namely that U.S. firms should have access to resources and markets around the world. Tungsten and tin are important resources, but the more fundamental issues in Vietnam and other cases has been access. Access to resources and markets has long been at the core of U.S. international policy.

Oil, But Much More Than Oil

As illustrated in Butler’s references to Mexico (1914) and China (1927), as well as by U.S. interventions in Iran (1953) and in Iraq (2023), oil has often been at the center of the story of U.S. imperialism. Oil, after all, has long been a very important, big, and profitable industry. It should be no surprise that it is often very important in many cases of access. 

But other industries are also drivers in access disputes. Financial interests have often been an issue of concern in U.S. operations. Vast mineral reserves were an issue in the Congo, and are likely an issue behind the current U.S. focus on Greenland. And even the lowly banana was at stake in Guatemala. 

In none of these cases, however, was the particular industry per se the issue. Much larger was the principle of access. Access is at the center of the “rules of the game” as defined by the U.S. government and U.S. business. 

Of course, in each instance of U.S. intervention abroad, other matters are at play. The U.S. actions under several presidents in Afghanistan, for example, were driven by the unfolding of long-term strategic conflicts. And in today’s events, Trump’s particular idiocies certainly play a role. But ultimately, it is the interests of U.S. firms, and the operations of U.S. capitalism, that are engraved on U.S. international actions. 

Arthur MacEwan is professor emeritus of economics at the University of Massachusetts Boston.